Introduction
Maternal health is of great concern in Indonesia. The country is not only lagging behind in regional comparisons but will also miss its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on maternal mortality (MDG5). Despite high utilization of antenatal care (ANC) services and high rates of skilled birth attendance, maternal mortality has remained stubbornly above 200 per 100,000 live births in the past decade. This is about twice as high as the MDG target set at 102 per 100,000 live births and also represents one of the highest maternal mortality rates in Southeast Asia.
Child mortality in Indonesia, on the other hand, has been declining. Under five mortality dropped from 81 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 40 per 1,000 live births in 2010 which is not so far off from the MDG-target of 32 per 1,000 live births (UNICEF, 2012) . While there has been progress in reducing under five mortality, most child deaths now occur in the first 12 months of life (32 per 1,000); especially in the neonatal period (19 per 1,000), i.e. the first months after birth. According to UNICEF (2012) , with adequate care, most of these neonatal deaths are preventable (see also Ekman et al., 2008) . Moreover, neonatal mortality in Indonesia is subject to geographic variation, with rural areas clearly lagging behind. This is symptomatic of lower access to and utilization of preventive care in these areas. Neonatal mortality rates among Indonesian children who do not receive antenatal care are about 5 times higher than mortality rates of children benefiting from these services (UNICEF, 2012).
With maternal and child mortality being an integral part of the MDGs, developing countries have been experimenting with different types of interventions to increase access and utilization of maternal care services, including, for example, subsidies, vouchers or conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs).
However, evidence on the effectiveness of these interventions is still scarce and the debate on how best to promote access and utilization is still ongoing (see Broghi et al., 2006; Kruk et al. 2007; Comfort et al., 2013; Dzakpasu et al., 2014) . For example, De Alegri et al. (2012) show that in Burkina Faso a 80% subsidy on delivery services increased the number of institutional deliveries from 49 to 84% over a 5 year period. Bangladesh, Cambodia and Kenya, have been experimenting with vouchers for maternity care. While studies have found generally positive effects of vouchers on institutional deliveries, these schemes appear to be less successful in promoting and improving antenatal care (see e.g. Achmed and Khan, 2011; Bellows et al., 2011; Obare et al., 2013; Van de Poel et al., 2014) . Explanations for this failure of vouchers to enhance the uptake of maternal care services include lack of information and awareness of the voucher scheme and a lack of trust that the services are indeed delivered free of charge (see Obare et al., 2013) . Other countries, such as Afghanistan, India and Nepal, have introduced conditional cash transfer programs to influence maternal health related behaviors. In the case of Nepal, for example, Powell-Jackson and Hanson (2012) find only modest effects, with the CCT increasing the likelihood of delivery by a skilled attendant by 4.2 percentage points. In Afghanistan, Lin and Salehi (2013) find increases in service utilization of about 8 percentage points due to the CCT. In India, Lim et al. (2010) find stronger effects on infacility births and also a positive effect of the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) scheme on antenatal care. The authors also show that the JSY is associated with a 2 to 4 percent reduction in neonatal and perinatal deaths. Still, despite these studies, the effect of subsidies, vouchers, or CCTs on mortality and other health outcomes has not yet been well documented and understood (Glassman et al., 2013) .
While subsidies, vouchers and CCTs are targeted at maternal health services specifically, health insurance programs typically aim at improving access to a broader range of health services, of which maternal health is only one aspect.
Indeed, it may be argued that if insurance is sufficient to improve access to maternal health care services, other interventions such as vouchers and CCTs may not be needed. So far, studies that have investigated the effect of insurance on the utilization of maternal health services specifically are scarce and do not establish a causal relationship (for a systematic review see Comfort et al., 2013) . For example, Mensah et al. (2010) assess the effects of the national health insurance scheme in Ghana, while Long et al. (2010) study the New Co-operative Medical System in China. Both these cross-section based studies document improved access to maternal health care which they attribute to insurance. In Ghana, Mensah et al. (2010) argue that health insurance leads to an increase in the likelihood of using ANC by 13 to 15 percentage points; an increase in facility based deliveries by 12 to 18 percentage points, and an increase in births assisted by a trained professional by 14 percentage points. While the authors note less complications during births, they do not find substantial improvements in the quality of ANC services used, i.e. on blood and urine testing. In China, Long et al. (2010) find increases in antenatal care and an increase in facility based deliveries from 45 to 80%. In a follow-up study the authors argue that health insurance coverage may also facilitate the overuse of non-medical caesarian sections with insured women being 1.3 times more likely to have a caesarian (Long et al., 2012) .
Large scale insurance schemes as in Ghana and China are still rare in developing country contexts. In many countries health insurance schemes remain fragmented and often operate only at a community level (Lagomarsino et al., 2012) . The advantage of community or regional schemes which operate at a decentralized level is that they are arguably much closer to the target population and therefore also better positioned to respond to the needs of the population (see e.g. Skoufias et al, 2011) . Conversely, local schemes may suffer from a lack of financial and human resources, and limited administrative capacity and technical expertise. So far, however, there is little empirical evidence on the performance of decentralized insurance schemes particularly with respect to maternal and child health care.
The current policy context in Indonesia offers a unique opportunity to study the effects of such decentralized health care financing schemes. Since Indonesia's fiscal and political decentralization in 2001, district governments have increasingly engaged in local health insurance programs. This development has been mainly driven by coverage gaps in national health insurance programs and local political factors. But despite a common motivation and institutional context, these schemes vary greatly in scope and design (Gani et al., 2008; 2009; Budiyati et al. 2013) .
Against this background, this paper explicitly investigates how district health care financing schemes in Indonesia affect access to maternal health care services. In contrast to earlier studies we provide, arguably, a more robust identification strategy. We also pay particular attention to the differences in local policy design and their influence on service delivery. The paper adds to the scant literature on the effects of health care financing and access to maternal care. In addition, this is one of the few studies that also investigates differences in institutional and policy design within a single country context (see e.g. Faguet, 2004; Akin et al, 2007; Galiani et al, 2008) .
The study combines data from a unique survey of District Health Offices (DHOs) -which are responsible for the implementation of the district health policies -with the Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys (IDHS) from 2007 and 2012, the annual Indonesian Socio-economic Survey (Susenas), and the Village Infrastructure Survey (Podes). The DHO survey provides detailed information on the design of the local schemes, such as the year of implementation, benefits package, premiums and co-payments, institutional arrangements, management and provider contracting. Our identification strategy exploits variation in local health financing reforms across districts and year of birth of children under 5 years of age. Using district-level fixed effects specifications, we find that local health care financing initiatives increase antenatal care visits and to a lesser extent decrease the percentage of home births, especially for households that fall outside the target group for the national (subsidized) health insurance programs. Improvements in ANC are also observed in terms of the depth of antenatal services provided. We also see an increase in caesarean sections among women in the wealthiest quartile, but no effect on the number of births attended by a trained professional. The variation in design features of the schemes appears to be a source of impact heterogeneity. The observed positive effects of local health care financing schemes is driven by those schemes that explicitly include ANC in the benefit package. Furthermore, contracting local rather than national health care providers increases the positive effects on maternal care.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on the policy context. Section 3 presents the data and key variables. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy. The results are discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
Context
Indonesia embarked on a far reaching decentralization reform in 2001, granting a substantial degree of political and fiscal autonomy to district governments which are now to a large extent responsible for public service delivery. With this relative autonomy, district governments in Indonesia have gradually implemented local health care financing schemes, collectively known as Jamkesda About 10 to 15 percent of the population in Indonesia is covered by formal sector health insurance schemes. The Askeskin and Jamkesmas reforms expanded insurance coverage by a further 30 percent of the population. The reforms, however, still excluded a large part of the population in the informal sector. These households were not considered sufficiently destitute to be targeted for the subsidized insurance, while also having no access to formal sector social health insurance or private insurance. Many district governments acknowledged this coverage gap of the national schemes and responded by establishing local health care financing schemes -the Jamkesda -to particularly target those left out.
The local health care financing schemes were not only motivated by existing coverage gaps; many were also driven by political opportunity (see e.g. Aspinal, 2014) . With the introduction of direct elections for district regents (rural districts) and mayors (municipalities) in 2005, free health care became a prominent feature in election campaigning. As a consequence, the number of local health care financing schemes increased significantly after 2005 when the first district elections were held. In light of their local nature, Jamkesda schemes vary greatly in scope and design (Gani et. al, 2008; 2009) . This applies, for example, to the benefits that are covered by the schemes, the health care providers contracted, the management structure, and the legal endorsement (see Budiyati et al., 2013 for details).
As of January 1 st , 2014, the Jamkesmas program and the formal sector social health insurance schemes have been consolidated in a new national health insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN)). The new national scheme combines the beneficiaries of the former Jamkesmas and the formal sector programmes, with the objective of reaching universal coverage by 2019. In the first year, however, progress with voluntary enrolment for the non-subsidised informal sector has been slow, with only 2.5% of the non-covered population enrolling (WHO, 2015) . Currently it remains unclear if and how the existing local health insurance schemes will be incorporated into the new national policy by 2019. Out of a total of 442 districts that were contacted, 262 districts responded (60 percent). 2 Figure 1 shows the geographic spread of the districts and their status in the DHO survey. Red areas are districts which were not contacted due to missing contact details. Yellow areas are districts which were contacted but did not respond. The blue and green areas are districts which responded to the survey. Green areas are districts which were not running a local health care financing scheme at the time of the survey. The districts that responded cover approximately 58 percent of the Indonesian population in 2010. The nonresponse rate is a cause of concern with regard to sample selection bias and the generalizability of the district survey. However, consistent with Budiyati et al. (2013) , and as will be discussed later, we find no evidence of sample selection bias affecting our estimation results (see Section 4 for details). The IDHS is a nationally representative survey that provides detailed information on households, individual health behavior and other characteristics.
The main survey respondents are women aged 15-49. For the analysis we rely 1 For a detailed description of the survey see Budiyati et al. (2013) . 2 Indonesia was made up of 497 districts at the time the DHO survey was conducted. 55 districts could not be contacted for the DHO survey because no contact details could be obtained for these districts.
on information gathered on children aged between 0 and 5 years of age. Due to the random sampling process of the IDHS data not all districts are represented in each survey wave. Combined, the two IDHS surveys sampled children from 234 of the 262 districts that responded to the DHO Survey.
The Susenas is a socio-economic survey conducted annually among a crosssection of approximately 200,000 households. The survey is representative at the district level and includes basic information on health care but is less detailed than the IDHS. For the purpose of our analysis, we use the Susenas to obtain information on the average health insurance coverage rates in districts.
The Podes village census is conducted every two to three years and provides information on all rural villages and urban precincts in Indonesia, including details on infrastructure and availability of health care providers.
We merge the data from the DHO Survey to the pooled IDHS survey data The districts also show a large degree of variation in Jamkesda design char- Podes (2003 Podes ( , 2006 Podes ( , 2008 .
acteristics (Table 2) . About 35 percent of the districts have Jamkesda schemes that cover prenatal and maternity care services, while 25 percent cover delivery services. Almost all the districts cover services provided at the local health centre (92 percent), and district and province/national hospitals (88 respectively 82 percent). Only a quarter also contracted private hospitals, mainly for referrals. Closing the coverage gap left by national insurance programs and achieving universal coverage is an objective of about a third of the schemes in our sample.
Variation in institutional and operational design are discussed in more detail The remainder is managed by the DHO, in most cases through special divisions or technical units. In 20 percent of the districts Jamkesda schemes have been endorsed by both the district head and the local parliament, which provides the strongest legal basis for the schemes as these cannot be abolished or amended without approval from the local parliament. 
Outcome variables
Our empirical analysis of maternal and child health care concentrates on four measures: the number of antenatal care visits, the place of delivery (i.e. whether a child was born at home), delivery assistance (i.e. whether the birth was attended by a trained professional, i.e. a village midwife or doctor), and the mode of delivery (i.e. whether the child was born by caesarian section). Before we explore the effect of the Jamkesda on these outcomes more systematically, Table 3 
Empirical Approach
In order to assess the effect of the Jamkesda schemes on maternal and child health care services we use a linear district fixed effects specification: 5
where Y ikt represents one of the four outcome variables for child i in district k at year of birth t.
The main variable of interest is Jamkesda kt−1 , which is a dummy variable indicating whether a district has been operating a local health care financing scheme in the calendar year prior to the year of birth. We choose this lagged specification because the specific month in which Jamkesda schemes are introduced varies greatly and for many districts will not overlap with the IDHS recall period in the same year. Moreover, the use of antenatal care and any perceptions or decisions with regard to the mode of delivery and birth assistance are expected to be determined mostly in the months preceding the birth of a child, possibly overlapping with the previous calendar year. The coefficient β can be interpreted as the average impact of the Jamkesda program after controlling for the coverage effects of an array of national schemes covered by the vector γ.
The district indicators D kt include the share of the district population covered by each of the following programs: subsidized social health insurance Askeskin and Jamkesmas, the health card program, public sector health insurance, for-5 Linear models could be mis-specified for the binary and censored outcomes. Nevertheless we apply a linear specification in order to control for district fixed effects and to not lose observations for districts with few DHS observations and limited variation in the outcome variables. We did estimate fixed effects Poisson (for antenatal care) and logit models (for home births, assisted deliveries and caesarean sections) as an alternative. These yielded qualitatively similar results. In addition, we apply the trimmed estimator suggested by Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) , who argue that the potential bias in linear probability models increases with the proportion of predicted probabilities that falls outside the zero to one interval. They suggest a trimming estimator by dropping those observations outside the interval and reestimating the linear model for the remaining sample. For the binary outcome variables 82 to 91 percent of predicted probabilities fall within the unit interval, while less than 1 percent of the sample shows predicted antenatal visits smaller than zero. Finally, the Horrace and Oaxaca trimmed estimator yields similar coefficients to the linear regressions for the unrestricted sample. Therefore, we present linear probability models in the paper. mal private sector social health insurance, private health insurance and other schemes. We further control for other basic district characteristics, such as the share of the population, the level of electrification, the main source of drinking water, road access, and the availability of trained health staff. The vector X ikt controls for child-, mother-and household characteristics. Time invariant district characteristics are controlled for by including district fixed effects µ k , while δ t controls for year fixed effects.
In addition to analysing the average effects of the Jamkesda schemes we probe the heterogeneity in design characteristics S that relate to the population and service coverage dimensions of the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) framework (World Health Organization, 2010):
The vector S kt includes a dummy variable indicating if the program objective is to cover all the non-insured or not, the maternal health services covered by the benefit packages (antenatal care and delivery assistance) of the district schemes, and the type of providers contracted. Note that by design S kt = 0 if Jamkesda kt = 0.
Equations (1) and (2) will yield unbiased estimates of Jamkesda in the absence of unobserved confounding factors. The district fixed effects eliminate any time invariant factors such as topography, institutions and endowments, while inclusion of individual and district level characteristics should minimize bias due to time variant omitted variables.
The main confounding factor that we do not control for in equations (1) and (2) is potential change in district public policy that coincides with the introduction of the Jamkesda schemes. Policy reforms are rarely isolated events and it is not unlikely that local health care financing initiatives are part of a larger reform agenda of local governments. In the specific case of the Jamkesda, indeed, Budiyati et al. (2013) show that the timing of local elections are a strong predictor of the timing of introducing Jamkesda. 6 If these elections led to broader reforms then they may influence the outcome variables other than through Jamkesda. We test for this source of violation of the parallel trends assumption by including a dummy variable indicating whether a district has a directly elected mayor or regent. The timing of the first direct elections for district heads differs across districts, as they are determined by the time of expiry of the appointed incumbents' term in office after 2005. If our estimates are confounded by the influence of local elections and multiple policy reforms, then the results are expected to be sensitive to including the direct election variable.
To further investigate the presence of non-parallel trends, we estimate placebo regressions where we assess correlation between the outcome variables and next year's adoption of a Jamkesda scheme (see Table A2 in the supplemental appendix for detailed results). These regressions are identical to equation (1) except that we include Jamkesda kt+1 instead of Jamkesda kt−1 . Statistical significance of the β coefficients would be evidence of confounding trends.
Moreover, we also test whether the estimated effects are driven by fertility delays in expectation of the introduction of a Jamkesda scheme (see Table A3 for detailed results). 7
Finally, we address the potential sample selection bias due to the nonresponse in the DHO survey (see Table A4 ). We estimate a selection probit, for the probability that a child observed in the IDHS sub-sample can be matched to the DHO survey districts. An inverse Mills ratio is constructed from these estimates and included as an additional control variable in the district fixed 6 In fact, the timing of local elections are a stronger predictor of the timing of Jamkesda than are the socioeconomic and demographic composition of the district population, coverage of national health insurance programs, average out-of-pocket health care spending by households and health care utilization patterns in districts (Budiyati et al., 2013) . 7 We do not find any systematic influence of the schemes, neither on desired fertility nor on actual births. effects regression. The probit includes the same D kt and X ikt control variables as in equation (1). To support identification of the selection model, we include the DHO survey enumerator ID for each district as an additional explanatory variable in the selection equation. We argue that the enumerator interview skills may influence the DHO non-response probability, while there is no reason to expect that these skills are related to the outcome variables in the IDHS surveys of 2007 and 2012. 8 
Results
Table 5 presents the average effects of the Jamkesda scheme based on the econometric specifications described above. Column (1) shows the β coefficients in the base specification without covariates, column (2) shows the coefficients controlling for year fixed effects and individual characteristics, and column (3) is the full specification that also accounts for district characteristics. Columns (4) and (5) present estimates that are sensitive to the timing of local elections and sample selection, respectively.
The results in column (1) show that there is a positive correlation between the presence of a Jamkesda scheme and maternal care. That is, the number of antenatal care visits and the probability of receiving professionally trained birth assistance are higher, and the probability of delivering at home is lower in the presence of Jamkesda. However, this association seems to be mostly spurious correlation or driven by selection effects. As we add year fixed effects and control variables the correlation becomes weaker, especially when household characteristics are included.
The results in column (3) suggest that on average, the introduction of the Jamkesda schemes led to an increase in antenatal care utilization of 0.27 visits, 8 The enumerators were assigned as primary contact to a specific set of districts, with nonresponse rates per enumerator varying from 19 to 65 percent. There is no purposive spatial pattern in district allocation to enumerators, as each enumerator covered various regions of Indonesia to share the burden of long distance connection problems and different time zones within the team. The sensitivity analysis, columns (4) and (5), show that the estimates are robust, strengthening the interpretation of the results of the main specification (column (3)) as causal effects. We find no evidence of confounding policy effects through directly elected district heads, as the results reported in column (4) and column (3) are marginally different for all outcomes. Moreover, the placebo regressions show no evidence of other non-parallel trends. The coefficients for Jamkesda kt+1 are very small and not statistically significant. 9 The results are also not sensitive to including the sample selection term that corrects for the DHO survey non-response (column (5)). The enumerator ID code appears a strong predictor of sample selection, yet the results in columns (3) and (5) are almost identical. 10 This suggests that sample selection bias does not affect the generalizability of our results. It could be that any bias from non-random survey responses has been absorbed by the district fixed effects. Previous research has indicated that different regions in Indonesia are exposed to different health problems (UNICEF, 2012) . We therefore investigate the heterogeneity of the Jamkesda effects with respect to the rural-urban divide and across regions (i.e. Java and Bali compared to other islands) and wealth status. The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the increase in antenatal care visits is mainly driven by increased access on Java and Bali, relatively populous and wealthy islands compared to other regions. The density and variety of health care providers is greatest on Java and Bali, and this may have been important for facilitating the effects of health insurance. For the other outcome variables we observe no region-specific differences.
Effect heterogeneity by wealth status is presented in Table 7 . The increase in antenatal care is pronounced among the third quartile of the wealth distribution.
This also coincides with the target population of most Jamkesda schemes, as this group is not expected to be eligible for the subsidized social health insurance programs, while at the same time likely to be active in the informal sector and lacking access to formal sector health insurance. The estimated effect for the third quartile is sizeable and accounts for the total increase in antenatal care observed for this group between 2004 and 2010. We observe the same pattern for births at home, with the largest decrease for the third quartile. Here the effects are also still considerable, with the decrease in home births accounting for about one third of the decrease observed for this quartile over time (see Table A1 in the supplemental appendix). Births by caesarean, on the other hand, increase only for the wealthiest quartile. Turning to the individual components comprising antenatal care visits we see that Jamkesda is responsible for an increase in women reporting height measurements and testing of blood and urine samples (Table 8) Table 4 ). The Jamkesda is also associated with an increase in the share of pregnant women that receive a complete set of recommended services. The point estimate reflects an 11 to 20 percent increase relative to the annual averages. However, this effect is not sufficiently precise to yield a statistically significant effect.
Consistent with the increase of the number of antenatal visits, the effect on the provision of basic recommended antenatal services is observed mainly for the third quartile, rural areas and Java and Bali (Tables 8 and 9 ). For the other islands the impact estimate is also statistically significant, but slightly smaller. IDHS (2007 ), Susenas (2003 -2009 ), Podes (2003 , DHO survey 2011/2012.
The influence of the Jamkesda schemes' design characteristics on maternal care outcomes are presented in Table 10 . The benefits packages seem to affect the utilization of maternal care. Including prenatal and maternity care in the benefit package has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of antenatal care visits and reduces caesarean sections. 11 Schemes that cover costs of delivery assistance are associated with a reduction in births at home and an increasing likelihood of births being attended by a skilled professional and birth by caesarean section, but these estimates are not precise. Including the benefits packages in the specification renders the Jamkesda coefficient statistically insignificant. This implies that the Jamkesda effect emanates entirely from the district schemes that have given greater priority to antenatal and delivery services. While perhaps an obvious point, it also suggests that such services need to be included in benefit packages if such schemes purport to influence maternal health outcomes. 12
Variation in health care provider contracting shows mixed results. Including coverage at village health centres seems to favour antenatal care, which is a service that is typically offered in these centres or offered by providers that are directly related to the community centres, such a village midwives. However, while the coefficient is large, so are the standard errors, and the estimates are statistically insignificant. Village health centres are less inclined to deliver by caesarean section, for which we see a statistically significant decrease. Contracting district hospitals is also associated with higher antenatal care, as well as a reduction in births at home. However, once again the effect on antenatal care is not precise. For contracts with provincial and national hospital we see a different result, as this reduces the Jamkesda impacts on both antenatal care visits and professional assistance at birth. Referrals to higher level hospitals
11 It also has a positive effect on the probability of receiving the basic recommended antenatal care services.
12 Including the benefits packages in the specification on the specific ANC services, i.e. weight and high measurement, blood and urine samples etc. also renders the Jamkesda coefficient insignificant and shows that the effects are entirely driven by schemes which cover maternal care services. The results are not shown but available from the authors upon request.
are not (or rarely) expected to involve antenatal care or deliveries. In addition, maternal care providers such as villages midwives or maternity centres are part of local health systems and networks in which village health centres and district hospitals have a key coordinating role. Contracting higher level providers such as province and national hospitals is likely to shift resources away from these networks and weaken the link of Jamkesda schemes with maternal care providers, and perhaps reduces it's impact on maternal care. Finally, we see no effect of contracting private providers.
Perhaps surprisingly, schemes that aim to completely fill the coverage gap are less effective in increasing antenatal care. A possible explanation could be that universal coverage will spread resources thin, which may outweigh the effect of expanding insurance coverage.
Conclusion
We investigated the effect of local, district level health care financing schemes -collectively known as Jamkesda -on access and utilization of maternal care in Indonesia. The district pseudo-panel and district fixed effects identification strategy used in this paper yields causal evidence and contributes to the thus far mainly cross-section based empirical literature which has investigated the effect of health care financing policies on maternal health care. Furthermore, decentralized public health policy in Indonesia, and the subsequent variation in health financing across districts, allowed us to investigate differences in the design of these different schemes within a single country context. Overall, we found limited effects of the Jamkesda on maternal care. Limited in the sense that these schemes only affect antenatal care services but not infacility births or assisted births. Despite the already high level of antenatal care visits, the local health care financing schemes contributed to an increase in antenatal care utilization by 0.27 visits, which is about half of the total increase Podes (2003 Podes ( , 2006 Podes ( , 2008 , DHO survey 2011 DHO survey /2012 observed between 2004 and 2010. Furthermore, we also found evidence that the Jamkesda contributed to improvements in the depth of antenatal care. The Jamkesda led to a 7 percentage point increase in the use of basic recommended antenatal care services. This effect is sizeable because quality of antenatal care services is still low and in 2010 only 27 percent of the women reported that they had received the full minimum service package comprising of measurement of weight, height, blood pressure and the testing of urine and blood samples.
Further investigation into these findings showed that the results are subject to considerable heterogeneity. The overall effect of increased access to ANC is mainly driven by increased access on Java and Bali, which are relatively populous and wealthy islands. The density and variety of health care providers is greatest on Java and Bali, which may be an important factor in facilitating the effect. Disaggregating the results by wealth we saw that the increase in antenatal care was the highest for households in the third quartile of the wealth distribution. For this group we also saw a decline in home births due to the Jamkesda. The positive effect of the Jamkesda on households in the third quartile suggests that the local health care financing schemes helped close the coverage gap as this group was unlikely to be covered by the subsidized social health insurance for the poor, while at the same time also unlikely to benefit from formal sector health insurance.
Looking into the different features of the district schemes, we saw that the overall effect of the Jamkesda was mainly driven by schemes that explicitly cover antenatal care. This suggests that health insurance schemes might not have an effect on maternal care unless such services are covered in the benefit package.
We also saw that schemes that aimed for full coverage were less effective in improving maternal care, probably because of limited local resources to cover the full breadth of services to a larger target population.
Our findings highlight potential risks for the JKN -the new national health insurance scheme in Indonesia. First, if the JKN aims to improve maternal care these services need to be explicitly covered, particularly in light of the discontinuation of the Jampersal -the universal delivery program -since the introduction of the new policy. Second, previous studies on the Jampersal have stressed that beneficiaries need to be aware of the services on offer and their entitlements. Local governments in this context might be able to play a role in increasing local awareness. Likewise, the local health care financing schemes could be used to motivate particularly those engaged in the informal sector to voluntarily enrol in the national scheme. Within the current context in Indonesia, it still remains to be seen how these schemes will be used and integrated under the new national health insurance introduced in 2014. IDHS (2007 ), Susenas (2003 -2009 ), Podes (2003 , DHO survey 2011/2012. IDHS (2007 IDHS ( , 2012 , Susenas (2003 Susenas ( -2009 , Podes (2003 Podes ( , 2006 Podes ( , 2008 , DHO survey 2011/2012. IDHS (2007 IDHS ( , 2012 , Susenas (2003 Susenas ( -2009 , Podes (2003 Podes ( , 2006 Podes ( , 2008 , DHO survey 2011 DHO survey /2012 
